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L Introduction
On 13 September 1993 the Government of Israel and PLO representatives signed me 'Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Govemment Arrangements'.
1 The Declaration was preceded by an exchange of letters between PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, and Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin on 9 September 1993. The letters and the Declaration set the stage for the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Indeed, since this conflict has been at the heart of a wider confrontation between Israel and the Arab world, 2 these instruments may pave the Way for peace in the Middle East These documents, however, are only the beginning of a long and difficult process of reconciliation. Heavy stumbling blocks are yet to be negotiated away. Under these circumstances, one would expect the Declaration to be ambiguous and vague. And indeed it is. In this article I shall describe what has been achieved, seeking to point out the ambiguities and their possible interpretations. I shall also outline the major difficulties that lie ahead. Before doing so, a note on the significance of the Declaration and the letters of mutual recognition is called for.
II. The Significance of the Declaration and the Letters of Mutual Recognition
The Declaration and the letters which preceded it bring to an end a century-old ideological and legal controversy over the rights of the two sides regarding Pdlcsane/Eretz-Israel (the Land of Israel), territory that both communities regard as their homeland. The Declaration does not contain an agreement as to the political borders which are to separate the two communities or the nature of the future Palestinian entity. However, inherent in the Declaration and the letters is a mutual recognition by the parties of the other's existence and of its right to live side by side on However, this declaration did not expressly recognize Israel's right to exist 9 Israel, on the other hand, has offered in the past to settle the conflict, ™ and has even reached an agreement with Egypt to this end. 11 However, it has always insisted on relating to the Palestinians as a community of individuals, consisting of the Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and at no time did it formally recognize the existence of a Palestinian people, certainly not with the PLO as its representative.
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The mutual recognition not only changes the nature of die struggle over the land of Israel from a legal-ideological confrontation to a pragmatic conflict, contoured by security grounds only, but it also transforms the sides into equal parties. On the one hand, Israel is a sovereign State which is recognized as such by its enemy. On die other hand, though the Declaration itself does not recognize the PLO as the representative of a State, the Israeli recognition of the Palestinian people does constitute an implied recognition of the right of that people to determine freely its political status, and to pursue freely its economic, social, and cultural development 13 Indeed, the Declaration explicitly recognizes the right of the Palestinian people *to govern themselves' in the West Bank and Gaza strip (Article m( 1)). One can argue that the consequence of recognizing the Palestinian people and its right to govern itself in the West Bank and Gaza is recognition in principle of the right of this people to establish a state in these areas if it so desires. In light of this recognition, the Declaration is an agreement between two equal subjects of international law.
The international status of the Palestinian people, and of the PLO as its representative, is of course not dependent upon Israeli recognition. Since the mid-seventies there has been evident, if only partial, support in the international arena for the PLO as an organization which represents the Palestinian people, and which has a right to self-determination in parts of Palestine. movements and the states against whom they fought, which brought to an end the conflicts between them, were drafted as international agreements, and thereby reinforced the claim that these organizations, at least at the stage of the signing of these agreements, had become subjects of international law.?l During the public debate sparked off in Israel following the signing of the Declaration, the question repeatedly arose as to whether die Declaration is an accomplished and irreversible fact, or whether, perhaps, Israel preserves die legal power to break free of die Declaration and the agreements expressed in it, in the event that the FLO reneges on its commitments. After having concluded that die Declaration is an agreement between two subjects of international law, such a question must be answered by looking into the law of treaties.
"" ' The 1969 Vienna Convention on die Laws of Treaties applies, as is stipulated in Article 2(1 Xa), only to international agreements between States.
22 However, as further stipulated in Article 3 of this Convention, die narrowing of the applicability of die Vienna Convention does not affect the validity of international agreements between States and other subjects of international law (international organizations, for example) and die rules described in die Convention might also apply to these other agreements. We should therefore turn to die customary laws of treaties, some of which are reflected in die Convention.
The general principle which is expressed in Article 60(1) of die Vienna Convention establishes that a substantive breach of a bilateral treaty by one of die parties entitles die other to rely on tile breach as grounds for terminating die treaty or suspending its execution, partially or fully. According to Article 70 of die Vienna Convention -which is based on international custom 2^ and dierefore relevant to die Declaration -when a treaty is brought to an end, die parties to die treaty are released from any obligation further to perform it Nonetheless, die termination of die treaty does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of die parties created through die execution of die treaty prior to its termination. Examples of such 'legal situations' are die delimitation of borders, territorial arrangements, and recognitions. 24 There is dierefore a solid basis for die claim that die mutual recognition which is inherent in die Declaration and die exchange of letters created a new legal situation that can no longer be reversed by die parties concerned. Moreover, diere is a basis for die argument that die Declaration creates a Palestinian entity, with defined borders and broad jurisdiction (to be described below), at least in die Gaza The Liaison Committee will also serve as a framework for conducting negotiations for die resolution of disputes as to die interpretation and implementation of die Declaration, or any other agreements pertaining to die interim period (Article XV(1)). On this committee there will be an equal number of members from each side, and its decisions will be made by consensus and not by majority rule (Agreed Minutes; comment to Article X of the Declaration). In cases where such disputes are not resolved dirough negotiations in die Liaison Committee, die parties should refer to an agreed-upon mechanism of conciliation. Disputes relating to die interim period, which cannot be settled dirough conciliation, may be submitted to arbitration. Note that resort to arbitration is qualified: only disputes relating to die interim period, and not die permanent status period, may be submitted to arbitration. 26 In addition, there has to be a specific agreement over die nature of the Arbitration Committee, as well as on die issues to be submitted to arbitration (Article XV(3)).
B. The Stages for Implementation
Although die Declaration leaves a great deal of work for die committees, and many important issues are left without an agreed settlement, die Declaration sets out basic principles which will under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.' 26 Yet in tome cases it would be difficult to differentiate between matters that relate to the interim or to the final stage, since many issues of significance, postponed to the final stage of negotiations, will be addressed already in the Interim Agreement see infra. Pan IV(B).
guide the various committees. It is useful to delineate these principles through their division into the three phases of implementation that the Declaration envisages. This section describes the timetable for implementation as it appears in the Declaration. Note, however, that the schedule envisaged in the Declaration is quite tight. In view of the many issues yet to be resolved, it may be the case that negotiations and other events would cause some delays in the implementation of the various stages. According to Annex IL the agreement regarding Gaza and Jericho will delineate the powers of the Palestinian authority to be established in these areas. These powers are described in residual language, and they exclude from this authority matters of external security, foreign relations, settlements and Israelis. Mutual agreement is necessary in order to remove additional subjects from the scope of powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority (Article 3.b of Annex II and the Agreed Minutes, comment regarding Annex II).
In the second phase, i.e., after the elected Council is inaugurated, as described below, this Council will have authority over die Gaza strip and the Jericho area, which will remain part of the West Bank and Gaza, being 'a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period'. (Article IV). Therefore, once inaugurated, this Council will receive the powers of the Palestinian authority which is expected to commence functioning earlier (upon Israel's withdrawal). Nonetheless, from a functional perspective there will be a difference between the powers of die Council in Gaza and Jericho and its powers in the other areas of the West Bank.
Israel's powers in the Gaza strip and the Jericho area will apply to Israelis and Israeli settlements in these territories. The Israel Defence Forces and Israeli citizens will be able to travel freely on roads in these areas, and me IDF will remain responsible for the security and public order of the Israelis (Annex H, Article 3(b); Agreed Minutes, comment to Annex II). Beyond this, in light of the fact that Israel is responsible for matters of external security and for the foreign relations of these areas, it is reasonable to assume that Israel will feel entitled to redeploy its forces along the international borders of these areas (the borders with Egypt and Jordan) and to control Eyal Benvcnisti border crossings. 27 Apart from this, after the Israeli withdrawal, with the exception of the areas of the settlements, Israel will remain without authority to act within the territories from which it has withdrawn. In order to justify such action, notwithstanding the agreements, Israel would have to rely on the right to self-defence.
Israeli withdrawal and the transfer of responsibility to a Palestinian authority will bring about, it appears, a change in the legal status of the territories of Gaza and Jericho. Lacking effective Israeli control, these territories would no longer be subject to occupation.
28 It could be argued that granting effective and exclusive control in those areas to the Palestinian authority will provide the final condition missing for the fulfilment of the Algiers Declaration of November 1988, and the establishment of the State of Palestine.
29 If indeed the framework of the agreements between Israel and the Palestinians will leave in the hands of the Palestinian authority (and after it, the elected Council) effective and exclusive control of its own matters as well as residual powers, then such an argument would carry much weight 30 However, it should be <>mpha»iV<-rt that the phrasing of the Declaration may also be interpreted to support the reverse stance, as the Palestinian authority's lack of jurisdiction over matters of external security and foreign relations denies the Palestinian entity the conventional indicators of independence, as described under the Montevideo formula.3 * This interpretation is supported by the emphasis on the transfer of authority from the IDF to the Palestinian authority, (rather than assigning original powers in the Declaration), and by the wording of Article 6 of Annex IL which provides that in the interim period, the status of the Gaza strip and the Jericho area will remain unchanged, and will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Phase 2: The Interim Period
The interim period will begin with the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho (i.c, no later than 13 April 1994). During this period, a 'Palestinian Interim Self-Goveming Authority' (the elected Council) will be established in the remaining areas of the West Bank, which win not be included in the Jericho area. Elections to the Council will be held, no later than 13 July 1994, 'under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order' (Article HI). A number of issues concerning these elections are left to further negotiations, as described in Annex L 32 Another agreement that must be reached After the inauguration of the elected council (within an indefinite period following its election, which should take place no later than 13 July 1994), a change will be effected in the structure of powers in the territory of the West Bank outside of the Jericho area. The change includes a division of powers between Israel and the elected Council as detailed below.
The Powers of the Elected Council
The powers of the elected council will be established in die Interim Agreement according to the principles of Article VH of die Declaration. These principles point to die granting of legislative and executive authority to the Council, as well as to the establishment of independent judicial organs (Article VH(2), Article EX( 1)). Upon the inauguration of die Council it will take over those matters which will first be transferred to die Palestinian authority in Gaza and Jericho as specified in Annex II; die matters which will be transferred according to Article VI(2) (education and culture, health and social welfare, direct taxation and tourism); and further subjects which will be mutually agreed upon. Upon its inauguration the Council will establish various authorities to deal with matters of electricity, land, water, the environment, as well as an authority to administrate the Gaza Sea Port, a development bank, and an export promotion board. The Council will be responsible for public order and internal security. A 'strong police force' will stand at die disposal of the Council, which will ensure public order and internal security in the territories under its jurisdiction (Article Vm and Annex n. Article 3(c)). Still, the responsibility to defend against external threats, as well as die responsibility for die overall 33 Note that there ire two incompatible lisa of mitten that remain outside the Council's jurisdiction: Article V(3) (which does not refer to military locations), and the Agreed Minutes (which do not men tion but den).
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The question of tbe definition of the settlement areas will ariie beforehand in me negotiations relating to Gaza and Jericho (see supra text notes 26 to 32, discussion of phase I).
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See also infra text notes 42 to 43, discussion of phase 3. 36
The Palestinian side is responsible for sppointing authorized persons for this purpose (Agreed Minutes, comment to Article 6(2)).
security of Israelis in the territories, and for public order in the settlements, will remain in Israeli hands (Article Vffl). One might learn from the establishment of the various authorities under the aegis of the elected Council (eg., an electricity authority, water administration authority, and others mentioned in Article VH(4) of an implied consent to hand over further powers to the Council, beyond those which have already been transferred according to Article VI of die Declaration. Thus, for example, die Palestinian water and land authorities will evidently be authorized to undertake certain activities in die areas under their jurisdiction. The dissolution of the Civil Administration (Article VII(5)) may also foreshadow die transfer of its duties to die Council, although this might not necessarily be the case, as it is possible that some of the powers of die Civil Administration will be transferred to die military govemment.37 In the end, it is all dependent on the explicit definition of authority as it takes shape in die Interim Agreement mentioned in Article VII of die Declaration.
It has already been noted that die Palestinian authority, and after it die elected Council will have residual powers in die Gaza Strip and die area of Jericho. In contrast, in die remaining areas of die West Bank that will come under die jurisdiction of die Council, residual powers will be held by Israel, as stated in the Agreed Minutes (comments to Articles IV and VU(5) of die Declaration).
The Status and Powers of the Israeli Defence Forces
Beginning with the entry into force of die Declaration and up until die eve of die elections for the Council (13 July 1994), die IDF will redeploy its forces in die West Bank (Article XJJI). This redeployment, it appears, is subject to die IDFs sole discretion, and there is no obligation to receive die other side's consent. Nonetheless, there is agreement on die principle that military forces will be redeployed outside of populated areas (Article XUI(2)). The continuation of the redeployment to designated places will take place gradually, and will parallel die Palestinian police's assumption of duties. After die inauguration of die elected Council, die transfer of die various powers to it, and die redeployment of die IDF, die military government is said to withdraw, and die Civil Administration to be dissolved (Article VQ(5)).
The redeployment does not curtail Israel's powers over tiiese areas. Israel's redeployment of forces is not tantamount to complete withdrawal, and its powers over the West Bank area are not dependent upon die question of where die IDF will situate its military locations. Curiously, several provisions in the Declaration and in die Minutes note 'Israel' as me body which continues to wield authority after die said withdrawal, as opposed to die Israeli military government, established by die IDF in 1967.38 However, it is actually die military government diat is die body authorized according to international law to exercise authority in die territory subject to belligerent occupation, and die one that, since 1967, has acted as such in die territories.
The claim might be made that, with die wididrawal from die Gaza Strip, from die area of Jericho, and perhaps also from other areas in die West Bank, together with die dissolution of the Civil Administration and die wididrawal of die military government (as envisioned in Article VII(5)of die Declaration), die Israeli occupation of these areas will come to an end. This claim would be based on die loss of effective control, which is a necessary condition for die definition of a territory as subject to military occupation. argument with respect to Gaza and Jericho, it appears rather weak with respect to the West Bank. In tbis latter region, the more reasonable interpretation is one according to which the IDF continues to hold that region under the laws of occupation, to the extent that these have not been changed or modified by the Declaration and subsequent agreements. This interpretation is based on the continuation of Israeli de facto control (despite a redeployment of forces); on its continuing responsibility in the interim period over important matters such as land, water, commercial relations, and more; and on the fact that unlike the Civil Administration the military government is not being dissolved. Such a situation, in which one state controls a territory during a stage of transition from hostile to peaceful relations, is recognized in international legal literature as a situation of 'armistice occupation'. 40 The accepted approacB as to this type of occupation is that the occupying force is subject to the instructions of the agreement between the parties, and in addition -unless the parties have provided otherwise -to the constraints and powers provided for in the law of belligerent occupation. 41 According to this interpretation, the IDF retains its authority under international law, subject to any agreement. Thus, the IDF will continue to be subject in the execution of its various powers in tbe West Bank, including its use of its residual powers, to the norms of international law which deal with occupied territories. It will therefore remain responsible for maim-piping public order and ensuring those human rights applicable in situations of occupation.
42

Phase 3: Permanent Status Negotiations
The Declaration foresees a final settlement of the conflict, which will commence no later than the end of the five-year transitional period, i.e., 13 April 1999 (Article V(l)). This settlement will be based on Resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council of the UN (Article I). Negotiations for this purpose, which are to begin no later than 13 April 1996 (Article V(2)), will tackle the most contentious issues, such as the status of Jerusalem and the return of the refugees of 1948.
If no agreement is reached, the question will arise as to the legal significance of such a situation. The starting point for the analysis of this issue is the fact that the termination of the Declaration will not lead to a return to the situation that existed prior to its signing. 43 See supra text to note 24.
period'. (Article V(4)). 44 However, one may expect that this principle is only partly true. It is possible to identify two types of issues that remain to be settled. The first type concerns questions of territories and status. The second type concerns the future relationships between the two parties. While the first type of questions will indeed await the final agreement, issues of the second type will most probably be settled already in the Interim Agreement.
A. Questions of Territories and Status
The most politically contentious and symbolically loaded questions will not be negotiated before April 1996. In the mfantimr., existing arrangements will not prejudice the rights and claims of the parties. These issues include the political character of the future Palestinian entity (an independent state or a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation), the future borders it will have with Israel, security arrangements, the status of East-Jerusalem, 45 the right of the Palestinian 1948 refugees to return, 46 and the future of Israeli settlements in the West bank and Gaza. The only significant principle that delimits the final outcome is the ambiguous one embodied in Security Council Resolution 242 (Article I).
47 Indeed, the agreement to postpone negotiations on these issues greatly facilitated the mutual acceptance of the Declaration.
B. Questions Relating to Cooperation Between the Parties
Whereas the first type of issues will be left to the final stage of negotiations, a different future awaits the issues concerning the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian entity (in the interim period and beyond). The Interim Agreement is expected to establish a number of important arrangements in this respect, which will be designed in view of the forthcoming permanent status, and thus will most probably extend to the final agreement as well.
At the outset, it is necessary to emphasize the unique relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. Both communities are destined to share a tiny piece of land. The two neighbours will remain to a certain extent interdependent This interdependency calls for close cooperation between the communities, and for alignment of policies. Indeed, Israel would view cooperation as the best incentive for the Palestinians to keep their commitments, and therefore would push for such arrangements. At the same time, a future bond with Israel's developed and relatively much stronger economy could be problematic for many Palestinians, who struggle for the ideal 
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Bank. 32 Yet this claim conflicts with Israel's use of the greater pan of these waters since before 1967. Customary international law, as delineated in a number of instruments and in state practice, calls for an equitable utilization of shared waters. 53 Recourse to this formula, however vague, 54 may aid in bridging this conflict, and indeed the parties do refer to it According to Annex m of the Declaration, cooperation in the field of water is to be the first topic on the agenda of the joint Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation. Such cooperation will begin with examining 'proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period'.
But determining drawing rights is only part of the problem. The other part concerns the protection of the resources against overuse and pollution. This issue is crucial to Israel, being the country on die downstream side of the Mountain Aquifer, a resource that is very vulnerable to pollution originating in the West Bank. The way to address this issue is through coordination of the policies of the co-riparians in the spheres of water-use, agriculture, use of pesticides, etc. It is also necessary to mutually monitor the relevant activities on both sides of the political border (i.e., actual amounts of water used, location of wells, irrigation methods, use of pesticides, etc.). For these tasks, the establishment of joint commissions for water and environmental protection is indispensable.
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Thus, the final agreement between the parties may be achieved without mechanisms for cooperation in economic and other spheres. However, it will be necessary to establish reliable mechanisms for cooperation in the areas of water and the environment.
V. Conclusion
The Declaration is the necessary first step towards the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and hopefully towards peace in the Middle East It changed irreversibly the course of history in this part of the world. The two sides expressed their willingness to live side by side, yet peace is still far away. There are many stumbling blocks on the road ahead, which the Declaration evaded, but which are not insurmountable. If the pragmatic tone of the Declaration continues, peace is surely envisionable. 
